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MARKET SEARCH MODELS: A SELECTIVE SUR VEY 
I. INTROD U CTION 
The e conomi c s  of info rmation ha s b ecome quit e a g rowth 
indu s t ry in th e la s t  few y ea r s ,  s o  thi s s urvey w ill b e  ve r y  s p ecific, 
and s ornewhat a rbitrary. I ain going to fo cus on a s ub s et  of mo del s 
b elonging to that are a  of re search curr ently b eing r ef e r r e d  to a s  the 
e conomic s o f  imp e r fect info rmation .  T he mo d e l s  in thi s cla s s  all 
relax, in one w ay o r  anoth e r, the a s s umption that e a ch agent in 
th e e co norny has per fect info rmation r e g a r ding all mark e t  p a r am­
e t e r s .  Unc e rtain param et e r s  inight include r i s k  cha r act e r i s t i c s
o f  con s um e r s, w o rke r o r  product quality,  propen s itie s o f  w o rk e r s
fo r quitting,  o r  the specific w ag e s  (o r p ric e s )  o ffe r e d  by diff e r ent
firms . T he la s t  imp e rfect ion in thi s  r e p r e s entative l i s t  w a s
initially inv e s tigated by G e o r g e  Stigl e r  i n  a couple of  cla s s i c p ap ers 
published in th e Journal of Political Economy in the e a rly s ixtie s .
T h e  pape r s  I will discus s he r e  all follow in the t r adition s p arked by 
Stigle r, which ha s con:ie to be known as s ea r ch theo ry.  The
methodolo gy c an be  applied to any ma rket and, ind e e d, a large
portion o f  the l it e rat u r e  i s  set  in p r o duct market s .  How ev e r ,  I 
will  confine my di s cuss ion and exarnple s t o  t h e  lab o r  ma rket when 
po s sibl e. 
Th e standard n eocla s s i c al e conomic model compl etely 
igno r e s  info rmation, It do e s  thi s  by a s s uming that all a g ents know 
eve rything that is go ing o n  in th e economy. But thi s i s  a ve ry 
strong a ssun:iption and c e rtainly a g o o d  deal of ob s e rvable pheno­
mena is r elated to the fact that agents  do not kno w  e v e r y thing 
about th e ma r k e t s  in which they participa t e. One fundament al
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a s p ect of any market i s  the p ri c e  o r  w a g e  at which t r an s actions  take 
pla c e .  I f  the re a r e  n o  t r an s a ctions c o s t s  th en some kind o f  b a rt e r  
p ro ce s s  will pr e s umably l e ad to  a single w a g e  i n  equilibr ium. 
Impli cit in the a s sumption of no t r an s a ctions co s t s  is the concept o f  
p e r fect info rmatio n; by introducing imp er fect information th e 
a s s umption of no trans actions co s t s  i s  chang e d  al s o .  T h e  k e y  i s  
specifying the natu r e  o f  th e t r an s actions c o s t s ,  Se a r c h  the o r y  do e s  
thi s in a v e ry unique w a y: w o r ke r s  a r e  a s s umed t o  no t know whe r e  
t o  find p a r t icul a r  w a g e  o ffe r s ;  they may know t h e  g eneral  d i s t ribu­
tio n of w a ge offe r s ,  but they hav e to incur some " s e a r ch c o s t" to 
dis cover what w ag e  any giv en firm is p ay ing. Thus, a s  a w o rk e r  
loo k s  fo r w a g e  o ffe r s  h e  m a y  s to p  s h o r t  o f  t h e  rnaximum w age 
available in the market  - - w ith po sitiv e s ea rch co s t s  it jus t do e sn't 
pay to hold o ut fo r the high e s t  con c e ivable w a g e  in all c a se s . Th e r e  
i s  c l e a rly a problem h e r e  fo r th e s ea r ching w o rke r; he mus t choo s e  
a s ea r  ch rul e  (how t o  go abo ut gath e r ing o ffe r s) and h e  mus t d et e r­
mine the optimal u s e  o f  thi s rul e .  Early w o rk on s ea rch th eo ry 
fo cus ed on thi s p r oblem, and I w ill dis cus s two s eminal pap e rs 
which analy z e d  the w o rke r' s  p roblem, Stigl e r  [1962 J and M c Call
[1970]. 
B ut, a s  th e title of thi s  s urvey s ugg e s t s ,  I aim to focus 
o n  ma rket mo d e l s  of  s e a rch. Stigl e r  and M c Call analyz e o nly one
side of the market at a time . In particula r ,  they take as given th e 
dis p e r sion of w ag e  o ff e r s w hich a w o rke r fa c e s ,  and with no di s ­
p er s io n  there i s  no s earch p roblem, M a rk e t  s ea r ch model s 
intro duc e the f i rm s i de explic itly and attempt to define conditions 
unde r  which a stable ,  non-degene rat e di s p er sion o f  w ag e s  w ill 
a ri s e .  S e ction II di s cus s e s  Stigl e r  and M c Call as a further int ro­
duction and backg r o und to the s e  market mo d el s .  Sections III and 
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IV p re s ent the market  mod e l s  themselves. 
The follow ing c rit e ria ar e rel evant to the market m.od e l s  
I will di s cu s s:  symmet ry, pla cement o f  the s ea r ch bu rden, and 
s equ entiality . Symmetry r ef e r s  to the t r e atment o f  va canc ie s  in 
r elatio n  to the t r e atment o f  unemployed w o rk e r s .  That i s, the r e  
a r e  s ev e r al ways o ne c ould int r oduc e the fi rm. side o f  the m arket. 
One w ay i s  to t r eat fi rm s a s  con s i sting of s ome giv e n  numb e r  o f  
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j ob s .  Wh en a j ob v a c ancy o c cu r s, it i s  t r eated by the fi rm in a w ay 
exa ctly analogous to the w ay an unemployed w o rk e r  i s  t r e at ed; s om e  
s ea r c h  r ule fo r lo c ating potential employee s  i s  s el e ct ed and an 
optimal st rat egy d efined. A s ymm et ri c models t r e at va c ant j ob s  
as e ssentially different cre atu r e s  than unemployed w o rke r s .  P ro fit
c o n s t r aint s ar e impo s ed and, gene rally speaking, one s id e  of the 
market is given th e burd en of se eking out memb e r s  of the oth e r  
side. Thi s is th e s e cond c r it e rion mentioned above; who be a r s  
the burden o f  s ea r ch. O f  cour s e  it i s  r e l evant only t o  the a sym­
met ric mod el s sin c e  by definition the bu rden i s  s h a r ed in the 
symmetri c model s. The final conside ration i s  the typ e o f  s ea rch 
s t r ategy. S e ction II int roduc e s  tw o; optimal s ampl e s i z e (Stigle r)
and s equential (J'vi c Call). The fo rme r s ay s  to fi r st d e c id e  how 
many firn1 s to s ampl e and the n  pick the one o ffe ring th e highe s t  
wag e .  T h e  latte r s ay s  to s ampl e fi rms o n e  a t  a time until a 
s ati s f a cto ry w age i s  found. Othe r s t r ategi e s  a r e  po s s ible and I 
clas s mod el s b roadly a c c o rding to s equ ential o r  non - s equential.  
Thus, s e ction III and IV b r eak down in th e follow ing w ay .
S e ctio n  III fo cus e s  on s e quential ma rket mod el s .  Mo rt en s en [1973)
i s  a symmet r i c  s equ ential mod el and Wild e  [1975] i s  an a symmetri c 
s equential mode l  w ith the bu rden of s e a r c h  falling o n  the w o rk e r. 
S e ction IV fo cu s e s  on non- s equential a symmet r i c  mod el s . Butt e r s  
[1975] pla c e s  t h e  bu rden o f  s ea r c h  o n  the fi rm and Wild e [1976] put s  
i t  o n  t h e  w o rke r .  T h e  cla s sification i s  s umma ri z e d  i n  t h e  following 
table: 
I .  S equential 
1. Symm et r i c  [Mo rten s e n, 1973]
2 .  A symmetri c [Wild e, 1975] 
II. No n - s equential ( a symmet ric) 
1. Burd en of s e a r ch on fi rm [ Butte r s, 1975]
2. Burden o f  s ea r c h  o n  w o rke r [Wilde, 1976] 
F inally , s e ction V will summa ri z e  and try to s ugge st  s ome po s si­
biliti e s fo r future  r e s ea r ch . 
II. STIGLER AND McCALL
Stigle r  add r e ss ed the i s sue of  why labo r markets t e nd 
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to maintain a "pu r e" di spe r s io n  of w ag e s ( o n e  not a s s o ciated w ith 
the h ete r o g en e ity of  the w o rk fo r c e  or non-w ag e diffe r en c e s  in j ob s), 
and propo s ed that it i s  due to a lack o f  info rmation on the part of  
w o r ke r s  and fi rms . That i s, only if w o rker s and fi rms have 
complete knowl edge o f  all w age offe r s  and res e rvation w age s w ill 
a single w ag e  emerg e in equilibrium . Complet e knowledg e  me an s  
that a w o rk e r  kno w s p re c i s ely what w ag e  can b e  obtain ed at eve ry 
firm, and that e a c h  fi rm know s p r e ci s e ly w hat e a ch potential 
employ e e ' s r e s e rvation w ag e
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is. Wh en thi s is not th e c a s e the 
ma rket i s  cha r a ct e r i z ed by unc e rtainty and c o stly info rmation. 
T h e  fo rmal p roblem is to p rovid e  a mathematical  r ep r e s entation 
of the p ro c e s s  of  info rmation aqui s itio n which w ill allow o n e  to 
m e a s u r e  the b enefit s of s e a r c h  and w e igh them again s t  the co s t s . 
Thi s can be a probl e m  due to the obvio u s ly n ebulo u s  nature  o f  
info rmation.  
Stigle r  mod el e d  the p ro c e s s in th e following w ay. Suppos e 
that a w o rke r ha s s om e  notion of the wage off e r s  confronting him. 
Represent th e offers b y  a probability d en s ity function, say ¢(w). 
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T h e  w orker do esn't know wher e to find a particular o ffer,  but he can 
invest some r esour c es and get an obs ervation, That is, c is the
co s t  of drawing an observation a t  random from the distribution 
o f  w age offers, ¢(w).  This is how the worker gath ers information
in this market, wh ere information c onsists o f  spe cific  w age offers, 
Th e w orker's problem, as Stigler formulated it, is to pi ck the 
optimal number of firms to sampl e .  Clearly, if this o ptimal 
number is gr eat er than o n e, the worker will w ork for the firm 
paying the highest w ag e. Thus, in d e t ermining the optimal sample 
siz e (weighing o ff the b en e fits of larger samples against the incr e as e d  
cost) t h e  rel evant distribution is not ¢(w) ,  but rather t h e  distributio n  
of th e ord er statisti c x = max [ w } whi ch r e fl e cts the b est o ffern n 
giv en n draws from ¢ ( w). The cumulative density function asso ciat e d  
with x i s  given b y  G (w) = Prob [x < w} = cp(w)n, w h er e  <P(w) i s  the n n n-
cum.ulative density function of w ag e  offers . Giv e n  G
n
( w), the 
exp e c t ed best o ffer when n draws ar e taken is 
( 1) 
w 
E(x ) = J wg (w)dw , n w n 
w h ere [ w; w] d e fines the limits o f  the distribution of w ag e  o ffers and 
g (w) = G' (w ). The exp e c t e d  gain from drawing n + 1 obs ervations
n n 
instead of n is just 
( 2) H ( n) 
= 
E(x
n + 1) - E(xn). 
The optimal sample si z e, n*, is giv en by s etting the marginal 
expect e d  gain_ from incr e asing the sample si z e  by one against the 
marginal cost, c. Sin c e  H ( n) is d e fined over discr et e points, this 
condition reduc es to 
(3) H ( n*) = E(x , 1) - E (x .J < c < E(x J - E(x � 1) = H(n"� - l).n'·� + n..... - - n>t: n"I" -
Fig ur e  1 illustrates this condition, It pays to t ak e  the n�th sample, 
but not the (n"� + l)th . 
c H(n) 
c 
0 
L_ 
I 
I 
I 
• 
n* 
I 
I 
Figure 1: Optimal Sample Size 
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S ub s e quent analy s i s  sug g e s t e d  that und e r  the condition s  
d e f ine d b y  Stigler, the optimal policy w o uld not n e c e s sarily b e  t o  
take a fixed sample, but rather to search s equ entially . McCall
[1970] show ed, in fact ,  that the followin g  s trategy i s  optimal w h en 
the con stant co s t  of s ampling is c p er obs ervat ion and the di stri ­
bution ¢(w) i s  fix e d  and known. The w orker s ho uld set a r e s e rva­
tion w a g e  w 
r 
s uch that h e  s earches sequentially until he find s a 
w a g e  offe r w hich b ea t s w 
r
' That i s ,  o b s ervat ions a r e  taken one
at a time and e ach i s  comp ared to s ome hypothetical wage level, 
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w r
' defin e d  a s  that wage at whi ch th e w o rk e r  i s  indiff erent to 
a ccepting the w a g e  or paying th e s ea r c h  co s t  c and d raw ing one 
more s ample . Ignoring a number of c omplicating factor s and 
assmning th e wo rke r seeks to maxim.iz e income net  of s earch c o s t s ,
w r 
i s d efined formally b y  the following equation : 
(4) c = r 
w
(w - w )¢(w)dw = J ( w  ) ,Jw r r r 
w here as before¢ (w) i s  defined o v e r  [�, w ]. The ri ght hand s ide
of (4) is the expect ed gain from one mo r e  s ampl e given a curr e nt 
observation of w • In non-mathema t i c al terms,  J (w ) w eights wages r r 
above w by th e probability of observing them in o n e  draw and then
r 
adds up the gains ( w  - w ) .  Noti c e  that n o  w ei ght is put on off ers r 
below w . r Thi s total  exp e c t e d  gain from one more draw is s e t 
again s t  the marginal c o s t  o f  th e draw, c. This condition is illus -
trated in figure 2. 
Intuit ively, the r e a s o n  why a s equent ial s t r at e g y  is s uperior
to the optimal s ample s ize strategy used by Stigler i s  s imple; under
the sequential s tra tegy the worker n ever ov erinv e s t s  in information.
Suppo s e , for exampl e, that you we r e  usin g optimal sample size 
rul e s  and you dr ew n�' ob s ervation s . Now if on the first draw you 
r e c eived w (the maximum w ag e) then clearly the next n* - l 
c J(wr) 
c 
0 
wr(c) w 
Figure 2: Reservation Wage 
w 
r 
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obs ervation s  ar e a wa ste of time and r e s o ur c e s . U s ing a s e quential 
stra t e gy you w o uld stop aft er th e first draw . Of cour s e thi s gene r -
aliz e s to wage o ffers l e s s  than th e maximum - - a s s o o n  a s  the 
w orker find s a wage which b eat s w h e tak e s  it, n ev er finding him­
r 
s elf in a po sition of" going ba ck. " 
A s  s u g g e s t ed above, th e s e  approa ches to inv e s tment in 
information hav e a r eal rn.athernati cal appeal, e s pe cially the 
s equ ential rule. But thi s formal eleganc e stems primarily from 
th e total lack of ambiguity s urrounding the definition o f  info rmatio n. 
B et t er information is alway s w ell-d efined, too; it is s imply a high e r
curr ent wage. How information " w ork s" i s  tran s c end ed, with the 
fo cus being on the technology of acqui s ition ( or d i s s emination). 
This yi eld s a sp e c ific, us eful, formal s p e c ifi cation o f  inv e stment 
in information, tying c o sts  to b e nefit s in a way which p e rmit s 
int egratio n  into more s ophi sti cated model s.  
Th e mod el s outlined above ar e, of c o ur s e, th e s imple st 
v er s ions  of the sear ch problen1, and many variation s  and exten sions 
hav e b e en analyz ed. Howev er, th ey all hav e o n e  major flaw whi ch 
was originally pointed o ut by Roths child [1973); th e di s tribution of 
wag e  offer s ,  ¢ (w) is tak en as g iv en, Ther e is no explanation of 
where wag e  di s per s ion com e s  from and w h ethe r  it w ould s u s tain
it self over time . A s  Roths child put it, "it  i s  the the ory o f  only 
one side of the market . It i s  a partial partial - e quilibrium theory . 11 
[p. 1288]. Th e mark et model s  di s cu s s ed be low are addr e s s ed to
this criticism. 
But o n c e  again,  I am. narrow i ng th e cla s s  of mod els under 
consideration. Following McCall's analy s i s, a number of papers 
app ear ed w h i ch purport to d e s crib e market b ehavior. T h e s e 
includ e, a s  a repr e s entativ e sample, th e paper s in th e Phe lps 
volum e  [1970], Mort en s e n  [1970), and Lucas and P r e s c ott [1974). 
By and la rg e, th e s e  papers fail to make explicit u s e of a search 
rul e  and s uffer gravely for it. Now, to b e  fair, I should po int o ut 
that th e appare nt aim s  of the s e  authors were not to generat e pur e  
market model s whi ch carefully int e grate expli citly d efined s ea r c h  
rul e s .  For example, th e r elevant author s in the Phelp s vo lum e 
and Mort ens en w er e  inter e sted in explaining the Phillip s Curve 
starting from imperfe ct information, and Lucas and Pre s co tt's 
mod el i s  a v ery high-powered exi st en c e  pro o f  whi ch yields little 
in the way of  u s eful comparative stat i c s.  
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Mod e l s  wh ich do introduc e imp erf e ct informatio n in a 
fundam ental way via s om e  form o f  search ac tivity for e ith e r  th e 
colle ction or di s s eminat ion of information in clud e Mort en s e n  [1973) 
T el s  er [1975 ) , B utt er s [1975 ), and Wild e [1975, 1976 ]. Some of
the s e  model s ar e s et in  the product market and s ome ar e s et in 
the labor market, but  all  s e ek to gen erat e a non-d e g en erate di st ri­
bution of wa g e s  or pri c e s  e ndo genou sly. I will take the liberty o f  
tran slatin g tho s e  whi ch are in th e product marke t  into th e labor 
marke t  in order to fa c ilitate compari s ons.  A s  mentioned in th e 
introductio n, the s e  mod e l s  can b e  cla s s ed a c c ording to s everal 
criteria; s ymmetri c v er s u s  non-symmetric, s eq uential v er s us non -
sequential, and a c cording t o  w ho bears th e burden o f  search. T he s e  
notion s  w ill b e c ome clearer a s  w e  g o  o n, but for now I r emind th e 
r eader that symm etry refers to how va can c i e s are tr eat ed vi s -a -
v i s  unemploy ed w orkers ,  s equ entiality refer s  t o  the s ear c h  
s trate g y, and the burden of  s earc h  r efers to who kno c k s  on who s e  
door. All the s e  mod els  ar e conc erned with the exi s t en c e  o f  wage 
di s p er sion a s  a pr er equi sit e  to further analy s i s .  There are c l ea rly 
r ea s o n s  for studying these models beyond showing that wag e  di s­
p er s i o n  can exi s t  and pers i st, and o n e  canno t i gnore the empir ical 
i s s u e  of j u s t  how much w a g e  d i s p er s io n  is explained by imp erf e c t  
info rmation. But mo r e  g en e ral c o n s id eration of  the e ffe ct int r o­
ducing imperfect information has o n  mark e t  structure has await ed 
r e solution o f  th e th eoretical exist ence problem. 3 Fortunat e ly,  w e
are making s ome prog r e s s , 
III. MORTENSEN AND WILDE
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The two pape r s  in thi s section are sequential market sea rch 
model s .  Both study conditions unde r w hich w ag e  di s p er s io n  c o uld 
a ri se and maintain itself over tim e  a s  w o r ker s res pond to it ,  but 
Mo r tensen is s ymme t ric and Wilde is a symmet ric. T he fir s t
pape r I'm going t o  di s cu s s i s  Morten s en '  s .  Like T el s  er' s model
thi s  is a symm etric, s equential approach to generating a s table
equilibrium which is characterized by a di s pe r s ion of w ag e s  ( that 
i s ,  in some s en s e  the equilibrium is to b e  a di s tribution of  wage s ,
not a s ingle w ag e  a s  in the cla s sical approach). Symme try i s
reflected i n  the w ay vacancie s are treated : exactly analogo u s  t o
th e w ay unemployed w orker s are tr eat ed. Let U b e  t h e  number 
o f  unemployed w orker s in some given pe riod and let V be the
number of vacancie s. A s s ume a con s tant turnover rate of o s o  that
the duration of a job is l/o. Now if we j u s t  turn all the s e  unemplo yed 
w orker s and vacanc i e s  loose and let them s a mple each othe r  us ing
s ome kind of sequential strat egy what we have i s  a nightmare; w e  
need some kind of s t ructure en the pro c e s s. Mortens en get s this  
struct ure by a s s uming th e labor market c on s i s t s  of m di s tinct  place s 
w h er e  empl oyers and worke r s  can meet . At the b eginning o f  the
n1a rket period each unemploye d worke r  go e s  to exactly one .ex change
and e a ch vacancy is li s ted at exactly one exchange. T he s e  allocations 
of w orke r s  and vacancies are random. Since all m exchanges a re 
identical, it s uffices to con side r  a single rep resentative exchange 
in a repre sentative pe riod .  
Let x1 b e  t h e  numb er of  unemplo y ed w orker s w h o  arrive in 
the p erio d and let x2 b e  the numb er of vacancie s .  T he pair (x1, x2)
i s  a rando m  variable and may differ a cro s s  exchang e s  w ithin a 
market p eri od or it may diff er a cro s s  market pe r i o d s  within a 
given exchange .  Now, the crucial feature o f  Mo rt en s en' s model
i s  how the pair (x1 , x2) dete rmine s the w age rate which obt ains 
on th e exchan ge. A s s ume that all w orker s and firms a re homo­
geneous . Using th e Mc Call sea rch rule , e ach unemployed w o rker
s et s  a reservation w ag e ,  w. Similarly, e ach fi rm (i.e. va c ancy) 
has  a r e s ervation o ffer, w, defined to be that w age rate at w hich
t he firm is indiffe rent to filling the vacancy or waiting and trying 
to hir e  a w orker to fill the vacancy at a lower w age in the next 
p eriod. Cl e arly, w >�is a nece s s a ry co nditio n for any emplo y­
m ent to o c c ur, and thi s  i s  s hown to b e  true in equilib rium. Given 
these res ervation w age s (see below fo r explicit definition s )  the 
a ctual w ag e  is d efined a s  
(5) w = 
{w if x >x 2 1 
w if x2 < x - - 1 
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and the number of v a c ancie s filled i s  min[x1
, x2
}. The logic i s  
that within a given ex change i n  a given period th e law o f  s upply and 
d emand s till ho ld s; if the s upply of vacanc i e s  exc e ed s  th e demand
for vacanci e s  ( unemploy ed w orkers) the n  the w ag e  ri s e s  to w. If 
the oppo site ho lds then the w ag e  fall s to�· S in c e  the a r rival of 
vacanc i e s  and unemployed w orker s i s  random, so is the w age, 
Thu s ,  the "ba r g aining r ule" expr e s s ed by (5) int ro duce s the 
element of unce rtainty needed to support w age di s pe r sion, A
cons t ant flow of igno rance, gene rate d  by the exit o f  old w orker s 
and the ent ry of new uninfo rmed worke rs, kee p s  the di s pers on fro m 
collap s ing , 
Formally, this all w orks in the following way . If U, V and 
m are assumed to b e  large , the x1 w ill b e  distribute d  via a Poisson
13 
proce s s  w ith mean A.1 
= U/m and xz is di s trib uted via a Poi s s on 
proces s with mean "-z = V 
/m .  T hus , (x1, xz) i s  a jo int Pois s on 
random variable w ith parameter (A.1, "-z ). Define F(w ) to be the
cwnulative den s ity function a s s ociated w ith the w a ge defined b y  
(5). Then if  a.(A.1, A.z ) = Prob[x1 > xz}, we have 
(6) Flwl "{ ;IA1, >2
1 
w<w 
w <w 
w<w<w 
Finally, con s ider the calculation of reservation w a ge s  and 
offers. In s pite of the fact that F(w )  i s discrete, treat it a s
cont inuous f o r  the followin g .  T he re servation w a ge i s  defined by 
(7) 
i Jv; .w + c1 = - (w - w ) f(w ) dw .  - & w -
c i s  the unit co st of drawin g an observation (visiting an exchange) . 1 
-:!!_. i s  included in the left han d s i de (co st s )  s ince it is s acri ficed if
the w orker does not accept the job this period and s ample s again 
(that is, it i s  an opportunity c o s t ) .  T he integral give s the expected 
gain per period o f  s amplin g  one more time, and 1 / & g ive s the 
total number of periods in w hich thi s g ain w ill be earned • f(w ) 
F'(w ) .  
The firm i s  a s s umed to face a s imilar problem . Let n(w } 
be the profit as s ociated w ith filling a vacancy at w a ge w .  T hen w 
i s  determined by 
(8) n(w) + cz = l J w[n(w) - n(w ) ]f(w ) dw. & w 
cz i s  the unit co st of s ampling for the firm. Otherwise the l o g ic 
i s  exactly the s ame a s  for the worker. U s in g  (6)  in the definitions 
(7) and (8) yield s explicit s o lution s for-:!!_. and w. T o  get U and V 
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endo geno usly (based o n  the entry rate o f  new worker s), a steady­
state condition , a g gregate expected hire s equal turnover, i s  utili zed. 
U and V define A. 1 and "-z which in turn define a., and the equilibrium
i s  completely characteri ze d.  
These re s ult s, and much more, follow fairly straightfor­
w ardly . For the purp o se s  o f  thi s s urvey the above will s uffice, b ut 
one crucial observation i s  that in this  symmetric specification of  
the market there are no externalities connected with either the firm 
or the w orker' s search efforts.  Of course,·  thi s h a s  been a very 
rough s ummary of the ba sic model, and Mortensen provide s a very 
s t im ulating, comprehen s ive analy s i s  of it. 
However, flaws in a s ummetric approach s uch a s  Morten sen 
employ s center on tw o con s ideration s .  T he first  i s  that there i s  an 
incons i stency in the bargainin g rule . Con s ider for a moment w hat 
is g oing on in the " firm" in thi s mo del. S ince worker s live for 
more than one period,  any given firm will mo st likely have w orker s 
hired during different perio d s  w orking for it. Thi s s ug ge s t s  that 
w orker s with preci sely the s ame pro ductivity may be w orking s ide 
by s ide in the same firm b ut e arnin g different w a ge s .  Any worker 
who is curr ently employed at-:!!_. could demand wand it w o uld pay the
firm to g ive in to the demand; by the very definition of w it doe sn't 
pay to search for another w orker who would w ork for-:!!_.· B ut one 
could apply exactly the s ame lo g ic to the firm - - it co uld lower 
each w orker' s wage to w and by the definition of the re servation 
w a ge it doesn't p a y  th e w orker to quit and enter the pool o f  unemployed. 
T h i s  indeterminancy (it isn't clear w ho w o ul d  dominate, the workers 
or the firm) serve s to  po int up the fact that a s  defined the b ar gaining 
rule is a highly s uspect w a y  to determine wage s. In o ne s ense or 
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another the bargaining rule mu s t  extend in side the firm. How thi s 
i s  to be done while pre serving the s ymmetry i s  not clear. 
The s ymmetry is problematic in another w ay ,  though; 
vacancie s are treated analogou s ly to unemployed w orkers . They 
are di stributed randomly, each to one an d only one exchange . But 
surely the exchange where a firm li s t s  it s vacancie s will be it s own 
employment office. In thi s ca se the nun1ber of vacancie s is not
random at all, it i s  controlled completely by the firm (what firm 
w ould allow other firm s to li st their v acancie s in its  emplo yment 
office) . The up shot of thi s and the incon s i s tency of the bargainin g 
rule i s  that the s ymmetric model i s  ju s t  no t well suited to the 
l abor rnarket . Morten sen' s model would perhap s  be better placed 
in the product market where repeat s ale s could be ignored , but 
even there it would be hi ghly specialized (e. g . , the hou s ing m arket). 
And while I have di scu s sed these problems in terms of Morten sen' s 
model, the y apply in general to symmetric model s of the labor 
market. 
S o ,  con sider the following a s ymmetric market search mo del 
4 
which utilize s sequential search . It i s  adopted from Wilde [1975]. 
T he fundamental problem i s  the s ame as in M ortens en' s mo del; to  
study the exi stence of  stable equilibria with w a ge disper sion. But 
the difficultie s a s s ociated with the symmetric appro ach are a s sumed 
away at the outset. Suppo se, then, that we have a labor market with
homogeneou s worker s and firn1 s . Let margin al value product be 
iden tical an d con s t ant for all workers . Let M worker s enter the 
rnarket each period,  s earch for a job sequentially in a timele s s  
s etting, w ork for one period, and then exit , being replaced by an
identical group which repeat s the proce s s .  The simple s t  example 
i s with tw o search c o s t  cla s ses  of w orkers . Let B1 of the M 
worker s have seach co s t  c1 and the other B2 have search cost c2
, 
w here 0 < c1 < c2• 
The a s ymmetry i s  reflected in the fact t hat
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the worker s do the s earching .  Firms act very pa s s ively, po s ting
w a ge offer s and simply w aiting to be s ampled . In equilibrium all 
firms mu s t  e arn equal (po s itive ) profit . Po s itive profit s are made 
neces s ary by the linearity of the pro duction function and the a s s ump­
tion that marginal value pro duct is con stant . A s s ume there i s  s ome
fixed co s t  of entry which s o a k s  up the exce s s, The problem is to
characterize the effective supply function generated by w orker 
se arch. 
It can be shown quite ea sily that no more than tw o w age 
o ffer s can exi st in equilibrium (thi s i s  due to the pro fit  constraint) .
Thus , any po tential equilibrium mu st con sist of either a s ingle 
w age with all firms located at that w a ge ,  or tw o w age s ,  w < w , 1 2 
w ith a1 per
cent of the firms locate d at w 1 an
d the other a2 percen
t 
located at w2• Con sider fir s t  the two w ag
e equilibrium . The w age 
o ffer pair (w1, w2) and the s plit of firm s  acro s s  the se offer
s , 
( a  , a ) ,  defines the di stribution from w hich ob s ervations are
1 2 
drawn. A g ain let J (w ) be the expected return to one s ample r 
drawn from this distribution when the current observation i s  w r 
Figure 3 illus trate s the function in thi s case. It turns out that
with a discrete di s tributio n  J(w ) is piecewi se linear, the kinks r 
come at w., and it hit s  zero at the maximum of the w age offers, 
1 -1 
As before, w (c) = J (c) . 
r 
Cle arly,  for a two w a ge equilibrium it mu s t  be the case 
that 
(9) w (c2) < w <
 w (c1) < w2• r - 1 r -
T hi s  condition simply s ay s  that the high search c o s t  worker s will
accept either w a ge offer but the low search co s t  w orker s hold out 
for the high wage offer. The question is, under what conditions 
does a two wage equilibrium exist. The answer is that it depend s  
17 18 
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Figure 3: Two-Wage Equilibrium 
on how one defines equilibrium. The most natural choice is Nash 
Equilibrium. Nash Equilibrium (in this setting) is defined as a 
set of wages (w1
, w2) and a distribution of firms over those wages 
(a1, a2) such that no firm has any incentive to change its wage 
offer, given that all other firms maintain their equilibrium offers. 
A major theorem is that no Nash Equilibrium exists for the pure 
allocation process. Refer back to figure 3 for the two wage case. 
When c > 0 then necessarily w (c ) < w • Thus, any firm located 
l r 1 2 
at w2 could lower its wage offer slightly and lose no workers, 
assuming all other w2 firms don't change their wage offers so
that the expected return to search function stays the same. But 
lowering the wage offer without losing any workers means that 
profits increase beyon �TI, breaking the potential Nash Equilibrium. 
There is no single wage Nash Equilibrium either. Suppose 
all firms were offering some wage w
0 
which just allows the profit
constraint to be satisfied. Even though the worker expects all 
wage offers to be w0, if he faces positive search costs he will 
set a reservation wage strictly less than w 0• This implies that 
if all other firms stay at w 0 then any single firm could get away 
with lowering its offer ever so slightly without losing any workers. 
Again, this breaks the potential single wage Nash Equilibrium. 
At the same time, it suggests that the model needs a little more 
structure; the same argument which shows the single wage equili­
brium cannot be Nash implies that the wage would eventually fall 
to zero. Therefore, we need to introduce some element of worker 
supply. Suppose there is some underlying supply curve; a distribu ­
tion of limit wages below which workers will not take jobs regardless 
of alternatives in the market. In this case Nash Equilibria may exist, 
but the only non-pathological one is degenerate at the monoposony 
wage (the wage which would obtain if a single employer controlled 
the market and could extract all economic rent fr.om the workers). 
While this replicates a result obtained by Diamond [1971] in a 
more dynamic setting, it is not a very satisfying state of affairs. 
It would appear that sequential search is inherently unstable, and 
the slight degree of monopsony power it accords each firm tends 
to mushroom, driving the wage down to its lower limit. 
1.9 
I have extended the simple model outlined above in several 
directions, all of which exhibit a fundamental instability. When 
limit wages are introduced the equilibrium is dominated by 
assumptions made concerning the distribution of the limit wages, 
and search, per se, takes a back seat. Part of the problem is that 
workers never directly compare wage offers, they always compare 
the current offer to some mythical reservation wage. If direct 
wage competition of some kind (not necessarily complete or 
perfect competition) is introduced, then a stabilizing spread of 
offers may take place. This is the essence of non-sequential 
sampling. Before getting into that, though, it is worth noting that 
the definition of equilibrium was crucial to the above conclusions 
concerning asymmetric, sequential models. It can be shown that 
entire families of a weaker type of equilibrium exist in the pure 
allocation model (that is, independent of limit wages). The 
equilibrium is similar to those used in other recent works in the 
economics of infor.mation (for example, see Spence's [1974] 
analysis of market signaling), but I have argued that these 
equilibria are inappropriate and that the Nash Equilibrium is the 
relevant one. But rather than dwell on these subtleties let us 
turn to the asymn1etric, non-sequential models, 
IV. BUTTERS AND WILDE 
The difficulties with sequential approaches to the market 
search problem are manifest. One way out of the bind (inconsistency 
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or degeneracy) is to introduce alternate kinds of search strategies. 
Two models which do so are Butters [1975] and Wilde (1976]. 
Butters places the burden of search on the firm and Wilde places 
it on the worker. The resulting models both generate stable, non­
degenerate wage distributions which are surprisingly similar. 
;But there are some surprising differences, too. In particular, 
it turns out that when the burden of search rests with the firm 
there are no externalities present, but when the burden of search 
is imposed on the worker there are both positive and negative 
externalities associated with search activity. Let us turn to the 
unique and elegant example of an asymmetric non-sequential 
market search model provided by Butters' model of advertising 
in the product markeL. The relevance of an advertising model 
to the current survey is that Butters treats advertising as a 
form of seller search. When translated into the labor market 
this yields a model in which the burden of search falls on the 
firm. The simplest version of Butters' model is a one-period, 
static analysis in which each buyer in the market is interested 
in purchasing a single unit of some good. The buyer's strategy 
is simple; he just collects ads (i. e., waits to be sampled) and 
after all ads are in he selects the one offering the lowest price 
(highest wage). 
The driving force of the model lies on the firm side. The
good is assumed to be produced at constant costs (analogous to 
constant marginal value product) and advertisements are sent 
out randomly at some constant cost per ad, also. The key is the 
profit constraint -- it is used to characterize the properties of 
any potential equilibrium. distribution of prices and sales (wages 
and hires). The number of ads sent out is traded off against the 
effectiveness of ads at a given price to maintain zero profits 
Zl 
across the entire range of prices offered in equilibrium. 
interested reader can refer to Butters for the details of 
derivation. The main results, though, are that if g(p) is 
The 
thi s 
defined as the density of ads per buyer at ·price p and a(p) is· 
defined as the density of sales at price p, then 
(10) g(p) = { � (p - Pol 
(11) a(p) = {;/Ip - P/ 
p <Po+ b 
p0 + b:::_p:::_m 
m<p 
p <Po+ b 
Po+ b :S. P:::. m 
m< p
These are the equilibrium distributions. p
0 
is the per unit pro­
cfuct>:m co ;; t , mis a limit price above which buyers refuse to 
purchase the good, and b is the unit cost of an advert isem ent. 
Thus, p0 + b is the "competitive price" in this market (the 
minimum price which just covers the cost of producing the good 
and informing the consumer about it) and m is the "monopoly price. 11 
The equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium in which prices spread 
out between the competitive price and the monopoly price. 
Stability derives from the ability of buyers to directly compare 
_prices. This, in turn, derives from the non-sequential search 
strategy which firms use - - the buyer is able to wait until all ads 
are in before making a decision. 
A final comment: just as in the symmetric, sequential 
model (Mortensen), there are no externalities in the above model. 
The search activity of any firm confers no positive or negative 
benefits on other firms which are not captured in the profit 
function. As I will-·show in a moment, this fails to hold up when 
the burden of search rests with the workers. 5 
Consider Wilde [1976). This is another non - sequential 
model. The basi c stru cture is the same as the last two mod els 
discussed in this survey .  Firms and workers are homogeneous, 
marginal value product is constant, and a pro fit  constraint is 
imposed on the firm side of the market. The difference is in 
the search strategy. Note that in Butters' mod el the firms 
a c tually used a strategy very similar to Stigler' s optimal sample 
size strategy, discussed in the early sections of th is paper . 
zz 
Suppose we employ this technique (Stigler' s) as a non-sequential strategy 
for the workers in a market setting, instea d of using a seque ntial 
strat egy. Then since all workers are id enti c al they will choose 
the same opti mal number of samples to draw. Let this be n':'. 
Now just as in Butters' case, the only candidates for equilibrium 
are distributions of wages which sp read out over some interval, 
say [�, w ]. Let F(w) be som e such c andidate. I claim that no 
F(w) can simultaneously satisfy the definition of a distribution 
func tion and satisfy an equal profit constraint for all wage offers 
in the interval [ w, w ]. To see this, the first thing to note is that 
there must be a mass point lo c a t ed a t Yi.. (i.e., F(�) > 0). If this 
were not the case th en, assum ing that n'� > 1 ( th e  only interestin g
case), no firm at w could ever attract any workers; i f  workers 
draw more than one observation and there is no mass point then· 
the probability of drawing all observatio ns at w is zero. But once 
the atom is admitted at-::!!.. the model b e c om es inconsistent; the 
mass point introduces a discontinuity which cannot be adj ust ed
for. This problem arises b ecause the only w ay a firm ¥.hich is 
offering w attracts a worker is if that worker draws all his 
obs ervatio ns fro m  firms o ffering w. The existence of a mass 
point at-::!!.. rnakes this possib le, but if a worker does draw all n* 
offers from the mass point, then he is indifferent to which firm he 
work s for and must choose one of the firms at random. If any 
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of the firms located at'.!!... were to rai se its offer by a very s mall 
amount, it would break the tie and the expected supply of workers
would jump. Trans lating this into profits introduces the di scon­
tinuity. So, in the simple optimal sample size model there i s  no 
non - degenerate equilib ri um . There i s  no single wage equilibrium 
either unle ss limit wages are introduced, but once again the Na sh 
Equilibrium is at the monopsony wage. 
The optimal sample size model is close; it does allow for 
a comparison of wage off ers which spreads the distribution, but 
the ability of a worker to guarantee hims elf multiple ob servation 
unravels the equilibrium from below. The que stion is how to 
modify the optimal sample size model to m aintain the spread of 
offers but eliminate the dis contin uity while keeping the burden 
of search on the worker. The answer is to make some workers 
extra unlucky in the sense that th e y not only draw w as an offer, 
but that is the only offer they draw. The idea is to make the 
actual number of observation s  yielded by a particular investment 
in search a random variable. The specific as sumption used is 
that the nmnber of observations i s  a pois son process with mean 
A. Search co sts are a sse ssed in proportion to A, which is the 
decision variable of the searcher. 
Formally, let F(w) be some di stribution of wage offers. 
Then if n, the number of actual ob servation s drawn from F(w), is 
poi s son with mean\, it can be shown that the c. d. £. of the maximum 
wage offe r, given\, is 
(12) H(w;A.) exp { - le [ 1 - F(w)J } 
Let h(w;A.) = oH(w ; A.)/(lw. Then if F(w) is defined on [Y::.,w], the workers 
problem is to pick that A which maximizes expected net income. 
That is, 
(13) r�' max I(\) 
\ 
n1ax 
\ 
Jw wh(w;\)dw - cA. , 
w 
where c is the cost of search, assessed proportionally to\, the 
intensity of search. 
The above arguments justifie d this formaliz ation of the 
technology of search from an analytical point of view. Does thi s 
treatment have any economic content? After all, it wa s a rgued 
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that sequential search dominates non-sequential strategie s. The 
basic non-sequential element can be justified on cost grounds ; there 
are lags and str uctural factors present in the labor market which 
tnake it more efficient to gather a batch of observations, check the 
highest offe r, and decide based on it whether to accept a job or 
gather anothe r batch of observations. The element of uncertainty 
i s ju stifiable direc tly; so.metimes a se ar che r i s  lucky and gets lots 
of observations for his efforts and other time s he get s on the wrong 
bus, spends time following up on fal se lead s, or doing any one of a 
number of unproductive things . Thus, it appears that the uncertain 
non-sequential search rule is reasonable. 
To close the model introduce the firm side. A ssume some 
equilibrium F(w) exi sts and all workers are searchi ng at intensity_
},';'. Manipulating the pois son di stribution, it can be shown that the 
effective supply function these generate is 
(14) S(w) M 
�' ,,_ 
N A exp {- \
'' [ 1 - F(w)J }
where Mis the number of workers and N is the number of firms . 
Putting thi s supply function into the profit constraint allows one to 
solve for F(w) in terms of\
':'
, Using this expre ssion for F(w) in 
(12 ) a nd ( 13 ) d e fine s I(A ) ind e p e nde n t  of F (w ) ;  tha t  i s ,  I ( A.) i s  d e fined 
totally a s  a fun c tion of A_ and the va r i ou s  pa rame te r s  o f  the model.
Taking the de rivative of I ( A. )  and s e tting i t  e qual to z e r o  yield s the 
'" 
op ti.mal A_ "' .  Thi s , in tu r n ,  c ha r a c te r i s e s the e quilib rium F (w )
alon g with i t s  limi t s , � and w ,  which a r e  now e n d o g e n o u s  
va r iable s .  T h i s  i s  e s s e n tially the s ame p r o c e s s  u s e d  b y  B utte r s .  
H owe ve r ,  a s pe c ial p r ob l e m  a r i s e s c onc e rni ng the l i mit wa g e ,  w
L
, 
wh i c h  mu s t  a l s o  be intr o du c e d  he r e  to c o nt r o l  the lowe r limit of the 
d i s tribution of fi rm s .  
A s  d e rive d ab o ve , the e quilib r ium i s  not s table . C o n s id e r 
fi r m s  a t  the l owe r limit, �· S i n c e  it c a n  b e  p r o v e d  tha t  F (w )  cannot 
have ma s s  p o ints , any fi rm which offe r s � c ould l owe r its offe r and 
l o s e  no one ; i t  is a l r e a dy b e ing b e a t  b y  e ve ryone , s o  offe r ing a lowe r 
w a g e  cannot hu r t  ( a s suming all o the r firms s tay whe r e  the y a r e ) .  It 
mu s t  be the c a s e  tha t � =  w L .  B u t � i s  e n d o g e nou s .  Tha t i s ,  unlike 
B utte r s ' mod e l ,  when the inte n s ity of s e a r c h  de c i s io n  i s pla c ed on 
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the s ide of th e  ma rke t wh i c h  d o e s n o t  suffe r the p r ofit c on s traint, we 
c a n n o t  s e t  an a rb itra r y  wL a n d  l e t  the d i s tributi o n  a dj u s t  t o  i t. 
B r e a king the p r ofit maximiz a tion de c i s ion away from th e inte n s ity of 
s e a r c h  d e c i s i o n  s a c rific e s a d e g r e e  of f r e e d o m. � ( th e  lowe r limit of 
the di s t r ib uti on o f  w a g e  o ff e r s ) b e c o me s endo g e no u s a n d  may o r
m a y  no t eq ual s o 1ne exo g eno u s l y s e t wL. T he up s ho t  o f  t h i s  i s
that a n  a d d i t i o nal c o n s t r a int i s  impo s e d o n  th e  mod el , ::!!_ = wL. 
S a t i s fy in g  thi s  c o n s t r a int r e q ui r e s  that the mo d e l  b e  o p e n e d  up in 
s o me w a y ;  s o rn e thin g  p r ev io us ly taken a s  fix e d  must b ecome 
endo g eno u s .  I cons i d e r  tw o c a s e s ;  th e fi r s t  t a k e s to t al search -
related co sts as fixed and l e t s the mix acr o s s  firms and wo r ke r s  
b e  e ndo geno us . T h e  s e cond po s s ibility  i s  to l e t  the numb e r  of fi rms 
be endo geno us , Surp r i s ingly,  the two ve r s ion s a r e  v e r y  much 
a l ik e .  In p a r tic ula r , the e q uilib r i um d i s t r ib ut i o n  o f  w a g e  o ff e r s 
in e ithe r c a se i s  
f(w ) =[ �.,][�] 
A '" w - w 
( 1 5 )  
whe r e  A ':' i s  th e op t imal int e n s i t y  o f  s e a r ch ,  a fun c t i o n  o f  v a r i o u s
p a r ame t e r s  w hi ch d ep end on whi ch mo d e l  o n e  con.s iders and ,;, is
ma r g inal v a l u e  p ro d u c t .  C o mp a r e  thi s to (10 ) .  f ( w )  i s  d e fin e d 
o ver [wL' w ] w he r e w i s  the " comp eti
t iv e " wage. w i s  sen s i -
c c c 
tiv e to va r io u s p a r amet e r s ; s inc e f(w ) m u s t int e g rat e to 1 ,  any -
thing w h i ch effects A ':' mu s t al s o  e f f e c t  w . In any c a s e ,  th e 
c 
in t e r e s t e d  r e a d e r  can r ef e r  to the full p ap e r to s e e  how th e d et ail s 
of the model w ork, w hat i s  impor t a nt he r e  i s  that th e r e  a r e  b o t h
p o s iti ve and neg ative ext e rnal it i e s  present in thi s s e t ti n g .
W h e r e  d o  the s e  ext e rnalit i e s  a r i s e f r o m ?  C o n s i d e r  t h e
e quilibr i um w a g e  o ff e r  di s t r ibut i o n  ( 15 ) .  C l ea r l y ,  the d i s tribu-
tion i s  s en s it iv e  t o  A. ':' . B ut A. ':' i s the c o mmon eq uilib r i um int en s i ty 
of s earch. T h e  p o i n t  to not e i s  that each individual w orker' s search 
e ffo rt s c o nt ribut e  t o  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  and ge n erat e  effects which work 
in t h e  s ame d i r e c t i o n  a s  a g g r e g a t e  s h i ft s in A. '' T hus , an inc r ea s e 
in any individual w o rke r ' s s e a r ch int e n s ity c 2.u s e s  f( w )  to shift 
d o w n .  But thi s imp l i e s w mus t i n c r e a s e .  T h i s  inc r eas e s the 
c 
s p r e a d  of w a g e  o ffe r s  in fav o r  of hi gh e r  w a g e s , g en e r a t ing a 
p o s i t iv e  ext e r nality a s  thi s s hift tow a r d  h i g h e r  w a g e  o ff e r s
in c r ea s e s  the return to s earch for other worker s . However,
s t ab i l i t y  r e q ui r e s that the s p r e a d  o f  w a g e s  c o n t i n u e  t o  ext end down 
t o  w L .  The inc r e a s e d  int en s it y  o f  sea rch o n  the p a r t  o f  the
individual w o r k e r mak e s i t  h a r d e r  for firms located near wL t o
c o v e r their co s t s  (either fix e d  o r  search re lated) . T he burden of 
th e s e  co s t s  is  s hift e d t o  other w o rke r s ,  either di r ectly or via th e 
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numb e r  of firms in the ma rke t ,  R e g a rdle s s o f  h o w  the s e  
exte rnalit i e s  a r e  channel ed,  the po int r ema ins that the r e  i s 
no r e a s on to exp e ct an optimal inv e s tment in s ea r ch. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The commen t s  in thi s pape r may s e em vague to s o me and 
not rigo rous eno ugh to othe r s . Unfo rtunately th e mo d e l s  a r e  
s omewhat math ematical and do n o t  lend them s elv e s  t o  being 
s urv e y e d, but the po int s I hav e made s u g g e s t  the follow in g .
2 7 
Market s ea r ch mo dels  can b e  cata g o r i z e d  a c c o rding to who b ea r s  
t h e  burden o f  s e a r ch ( thi s s ub s ume s s ymme t r y )  and wheth e r  s ea r ch 
i s  s equential o r  non - 2  equent ial . T he o r i ginal q u e s t ion that w a s  
p o s ed,  und e r  w hat condit ions w ill c o s t ly info rmation gene r at e  and 
and s upport  non - d e g en e r at e  p ri c e  or w a g e  di s p e r s ion, has  faded 
into the background in the light of  r ec ent r e s e a r c h .  The p roblems 
which fa c e  us now are c ent e r ed a r o und t h e  s el e ct ion of a s en s ible  
equilib r ium notion and the p roblem o f  effi c iency.  C omp a r ing 
B utt e r ' s mo del w ith Wilde s ug g e s t s  that the e ffi c i ency p roblem 
is clo s ely r elated t o  the i s s u e  of  who b e a r s  the ( phy s i c al )  b ur den 
of s ea r ch. This  l a s t  que s tion is a fa s cinating,  and imp o r t ant 
p roblem which h a s  neve_r b e en addr e s s ed directly.  
:i:c: 
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F OOTNOTES 
The material in this paper was p repared under G rant No . 
DO L 9 1 - 3 6 - 7 5 - 4 0  f r om the Manpower Adminis tration, U. S. 
Department of Labor, under the authority of T itle III , Part 
B, of the Comprehen s ive Employment and Training Act of 
19 7 3 .  Res e a r che rs unde rtaking such projects unde r  govern ­
ment sponsorship are e n cou raged to exp res s  f r eely thei r 
p rofessional judgement. T herefore, points of view or 
opinions stated in this document do not necess arily rep res ent 
the official pos ition o r  policy of the Department of Labo r .  
I would like to thank P rofesso r S .  Wu o f  the University o f  
Iowa .fo r  helpful comments on a n  earlier draft o f  this paper .  
l .  Taking advantage of my position as surveyor, I have chosen 
not to outline j us t ification s fo r s tudying markets with 
imperfect information in the fi rst place. This has been done 
elsewhe re ( see, for example, the excellent and now classic 
s u r vey by Rothschild [ 1 9 7 3 ]) , and sin ce I am surveying only 
a very small subset of the sea r ch literatu re, I think that the 
dis cus sion does not bear r epetition, 
2 .  The reservation wage i s  that wage offer at which the worke r
i s  indiffe rent to accep ting t h e  offer ( ceasing s ea r ch efforts) 
and continuing to s ea r ch for a highe r  wage. It is similar to
a limit wage but generally defined endogenous ly .  S e e  equation
( 4) for a formal definition. 
3 .  On c e  again I refer the inte r ested reader t o  Roths child [19 7 3 ] 
for a fu rther discus sion of thes e issues. 
4 .  Recently I have been informed o f  some related work conducted 
at the Federal Resea rve Board. S e e  Salop and Stiglitz [19 75 ] and 
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von zu r Muehlen [19 7 6 ]. Thes e models are s et in the p r oduct 
market but have much in common with my o wn analysis . 
5 .  While my dis cussion has centered on lab o r  market models ,
I have left Butters i n  it s product market fo rm in o r d e r  t o  
retain the spi r it of a dv e r ti s in g .  Modification into a labor 
market s etting i s  s t r a i ghtfo rw a r d  g iven Butt e r s ' a s s umption s . 
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